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LESI- YALO GARFIELD

ords hurt! Recent cyber bulling news
stories show that a word can be as
punch.' 1 Unfortunately, the
painful as a punch.
hurt!
Recent
news
law redresses
redresses thosecyber
who bulling
suffer injury
from harmful speech
speech through a series of innocuous
remedies, including financial remuneration
remuneration or retribution through minimal criminal penalties.22 However, the
law does not criminally sanction those who intentionally
intentionally
inflict verbal emotional harm to the same degree as
phvsical harm
those who intentionally inflict ohvsical
harm.33 In other
words, the legislature and the
courts are have not yet eleintentional
vated an actor's intentional
inflictions
inflictions of verbal harm to
the same jurisprudenial
jurispmdential echelon as intentional
intentional inflictions
of physical force.44
Consider the first fedConsider
eral cyber
cyber bullying case of
Ms. Lori Drew. 5 Ms. Drew, a
forty-nine-year-old
forty-nine-year-old woman,
was charged for using a fake
"MySpace"
"MySpace" account to torment a thirteen-year-old
girL6 The girl committed suithirteen-year-old girl.
cide as a result of the hoax. 7 Initially, Ms.
Ms. Drew was
found guilty of three counts of unauthorized
unauthorized access to a
site-misdemeanors that carry minimal punishweb site-misdemeanors
ment.,R The verdict was subsequently
ment.
subsequently overturned by a
federal
judge.,9 The conduct that Ms. Drew was charged
charged
federaljudge.
people" engaged in, and
with was one that "millions of people"
the judge was reluctant to establish a precedent on which
which
any person may be convicted for a mere violation
violation of
of
MySpace's
service.,,10
MySpace's terms of service.
Society does not impose criminal sanctions
sanctions for
the intentional infliction of severe mental anguish; instead, such acts are punished
punished civilly as the intentional
infliction of emotional
(IIED). Interestingly,
emotional distress (lIED).
IIED
harm to a perlIED is the only intentional tort involving hann
son that does not share a criminal
criminal counterpart.1111 Every
state has imposed criminal penalties for the intentional
intentional
12
torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment. 12
It appears that the intentional infliction
infliction of emotional distress
is accorded
accorded a lesser punitive status than the choice to
threaten or use physical force against another.

Words
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The same elements
IIED and the
elements are used to prove both lIED
criminal charges for assault, battery and false imprisonIIED, like assault and false imprisonment,
ment. lIED,
imprisonment, is
largely a mental anguish offense.
offense.1313 A prima facie case
for lIED
IIED requires, among other elements, proof that the
plaintiff suffered severe emotional harm.14
harm. 14 Similarly, assault and false imprisonment
imprisonment require proof that a victim
suffered
suffered a similar type of cognitive distress, such as a
fear of harm or loss of liberty1
liberty. 15 In contrast, battery reDhvsical
of
Droof ohvsical harm.16
harm. 16
quires oroof
At first blush, one
IIED,
might argue that lIED,
which is a harm of severe
emotional
emotional distress, does
not
share the requirement
not share
requirement
that the plaintiff
plaintiff suffered
some physical pain. However, according to recent
biological
biological and neurochemical studies, one can experience physical
physical pain in
response to a tone or a particular set of harsh words.
words. 17
17
If one accepts these findings as true, the physical harm
requirement of battery may be equally prevalent
requirement
prevalent among
those who are subject to severe
severe and outrageous conduct.
Given
harm as the
Given that IIED
lIED presents the same types of harnl
criminalized
intentional
torts,
society
would
be wellcriminalized
served
served by assigning lIED the same criminal
criminal status.
modem theorists may argue that, given the
Some modern
current state of the law, it is unnecessary
unnecessary to criminalize
criminalize
IIED.11
lIED.!>: According
According to these scholars, tort law has effectively absorbed the theories of retribution
deterrence
retribution and deterrence
9
19
through the use of large civil sanctions. These sancsanctions serve a utilitarian purpose by regulating human behavior and satisfying
satisfying the need for vengeance. 2"20 Others,
harm,
however, argue that tort law primarily "prices"
"prices" harnl,
whereas criminal law serves to prohibit socially
harmful
socially harnlful
behavior.
assignment of monetary
behavior.2121 Consequently, the assignment
penalties as both retributive
retributive and deterrent in nature will
never compensate for the larger
larger threat to individual liberty.1
According to those in the latter camp, in order to
erty.22 According
safeguard
safeguard against physical harm, it is important to instill
in society "a
"a general fear which cannot be adequately
adequately
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remedied by compensation."21
remedied
compensation."23 Therefore, an issue arises
as to the appropriateness
appropriateness of extending criminal sanctions
redresses. 22"1
already redresses.
to a harm that the law
law already
This article will explore the appropriateness
appropriateness of criminalizing
IIED. Part I will discuss the historical
inalizing lIED.
historical context
of civil and criminal remedies and evaluate
evaluate their modem
modem
application
intentional acts. Part II will explore
application to intentional
explore the
limitations
analyze whether the hami
haml
limitations of IIED and analyze
caused
IIED parallels the harm caused
caused by lIED
caused by intentional
criminalized
criminalized torts. Part III will evaluate
evaluate the appropriateness
criminalizing IIED.
lIED. The article
miicle will conclude
ateness of criminalizing
that, given recent neuroscientific findings, IIED
lIED should
be criminalized.

The common
common law distinction between
between modern
criminal
predicated on the victim's
victim's
criminal law and tort law was predicated
desire for retribution.2
common law, a vicretribution. 25 In the early common
tim could pursue justice for the same wrongful act either
through what is now considered tort law or through
criminal
law.226 Forbidden actions were punishable
punishable by
criminallaw.
the crown, as the King was said to have been wronged
wronged
by every impermissible act. 2271 In addition, individuals
individuals
could independently
independently seek retribution from impermlissiimpemlissiintended
ble acts through the legal system, which was intended
whether
to deter private physical
physical retaliation
retaliation..828 As such, whether
an action was brought in tort or in criminal law was
parties' preference.2
the wronged
of the
largely a function of
wronged parties'
preference. 29
A.

Punishing Civil and Criminal Wrongs

The present distinctions between criminal
criminal and
tort law vary little from their early predecessors. Criminal wrongs harm society while civil wrongs harm indijurisdictions have codified
codified
viduals. 30° Although, most jurisdictions
criminal
enumerated specific punishments,
criminal wrongs and enumerated
punishments,
31 Damages
Damages can be nomtorts remain largely uncodified.31
inal, compensatory, or punitive,32
punitive, 32and the assignment of
of
each
each is left to the complete discretion
discretion of a judge or jury.,,
jury.33
Tort damage awards seek to achieve
three
funachieve
damental
damental goals: (1) to make the victim whole or as near
possible;3" (2)
(2) to compensate
to whole
whole as possible;3"
compensate the victim for
additional
suffering inflicted by the wrong;1
wrong;355 and
additional pain or suffering
(3) to deter wrongdoers
wrongdoers from engaging
engaging in the same conduct in the future.
future."36 Thus, tort damages do not solely
solely
serve
serve to regulate human conduct, but rather to place the
injured party in the same position he or she was in before the wrong occurred.

In contrast, criminal
criminal punishment serves to curtail
curtail
future undesirable conduct by reshaping
reshaping societal
societal
norms.37 In certain
normsY
certain instances, criminal
criminal punishment may
result in the loss of liberty or finances. The legislature
is largely responsible for determining
detemlining the range of punishment that may be assigned for a specific
specific criminal
criminal
38
act. 38 As such, judges
judges have a degree of discretion within
these ranges to determine the punishment that is warranted in a given criminal case.339"
During this process, a judge
judge may consider
consider several theories of punishment, including
including retribution and
deterrence. Retribution imposes punishment
punishment as a means
of societal revenge."o
revenge.10 Deterrence
Deterrence imposes
imposes individual
punishment as a disincentive
disincentive to the individual and to
others from engaging
engaging in the same harmful conduct in
future., 1 These theories
the future."
theories are designed to satiate a
community's
community's need for revenge and to assure conformity
conformity
to desirable social mores.
This judicial
judicial embrace of retribution and deterblurred the line between
rence has bllllTed
between criminal and tort law,
particularly
particularly within the area of damages awards. In recent years, tort law has incorporated
incorporated the criminal
criminal theodeterrence.12 Courts have been
retribution and deterrence."2
been
ries of retribution
more inclined
inclined to use tort awards
awards to sanction undesirable
conduct and to help shape societal norms. For example,
in TXO Production
Corp. v.v Alliance Resources
Resources Corp.,"3
Corp.,"
Production Corp.
S19,000
the Supreme Court upheld the jury's award of 519,000
in compensatory
$10 million in punitive
compensatory damages and $10
damages for slander, reasoning that "a
"a substantial
substantial [civil]
award
award was required in order to serve the goals of punishment and deterrence."""
deterrence.",, The Court's rationale has
been recognized by scholars as a bourgeoning relationship between civil and criminallaw.
criminal lawi445 John Coffee recently noted that "the
"the dominant development
development in
substantive
substantive federal criminal law over the last decade has
been the disappearance
disappearance of any clearly definable
definable line be'
"4,
law.
criminal
and
civil
tween
criminallaw."46
Thomas Koenig and Michael
Michael Rustad have explicitly recognized
recognized that the criminal law principles
principles of
of
retribution and deterrence have been assimilated
retribution
assimilated into
" 41 Crimtort law, ultimately coining
coining the term "crimtort.
"crimtort."47
tort is generally
generally used to advance
advance the notion that civil
sanctions
sanctions can serve to regulate corporate
corporate wrongdoers.8
wrongdoers."8
Financial
corporate level is of great
Financial deterrence at the corporate
threaten the financial
value since loss of monies can threaten
health, or even existence, of a particular business en9
tity.
tity."9
Theorists have posited the existence of a retribu50
awards.10
tive factor within the assignment of tort awards.
George
corrective justice supports
George P.
P. Fletcher's notion of corrective
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theory. Under corrective
"wrongful
this theory.
corrective justice theory, "wrongful
acts create
create an imbalance in the equilibrium established
established
'the geometric
under criteria of 'the
geometric proportionality'
proportionality' of distributive justice."1
justice."5l The wrongdoer
wrongdoer "creates
"creates a shift in
in
resources from victim to the injurer."
injurer."5252 In turn, "the injurer should be required to give half the imbalance as
payment
payment to the victim"
victim" to restore the status quo.
quO. 5353 From
From
a purely economic
economic perspective,
perspective, corrective
corrective justice suggests that the wronged
wronged party is responsible
responsible for making
the injured party whole. 5454 According
According to this definition,
it is hard to see how the use of a civil award-viewed
award-viewed
from a corrective
corrective justice
justice perspective-provides
perspective-provides any deterrent effect. However, to the extent that a victim feels
satisfied
satisfied that he or she is now whole again, corrective
corrective
aspect.1
justice has a large retributive aspectY
Theorists'
Theorists' evaluation
evaluation of the use of punitive damages to support criminal
criminal theories of punishment has
played out in the courts, which, after the TXO Productions Corp. decision, have routinely
routinely assessed punitive
damages
damages against defendants in civil cases
cases as a means of
of
satiating
satiating a plaintiff's
plaintiff's need
need for retribution.6
retribution. 56 In BMW
BMW of
of
North
North America, Inc.
Inc. v.v. Gore,"
Gore,57 the Supreme
Supreme Court "em"emphasized
phasized the constitutional need for punitive damages
damages
awards
'reprehensibility' of the defenawards to reflect
reflect (1) the 'reprehensibility'
dant's conduct, (2)
'reasonable relationship'
relationship' to the
(2) a 'reasonable
harm the plaintiff (or related victim) suffered, and (3)
(3)
the presence
(or
absence)
of
'sanctions,'
presence
absence)
'sanctions,' e.g., criminal
criminal
penalties,
comparable conpenalties, that state law
law provided
provided for comparable
duct."58
duct.",,
The Court, however, has recently
recently begun
begun to halt
the use of damage assessments as a means to punish.
Although the Court has yet to use the Eight Amendment
Excessive
awards," the
Excessive Fines Clause to limit punitive awards,59
Court has announced
announced a series of cases that, under the
Due Process Clause, curtail a state or individual's right
to collect unreasonably
unreasonably huge punitive
punitive awards. For example,
in
Honda
Motor
Co.
v.
Oberg6 the Court ruled
ample,
j\1otor
v. Oberg,60
that due process principles
principles require judicial review of
of
6l
punitive damage awards.
awards.,, In BMW of North
Vorth America,
Inc. vv. Gore, a 5-4 majority
Inc.
majority ruled that the Constitution
Constitution
prohibits "grossly excessive
excessive punishment
punishment on a tortfea62
sor."
Most
recently,
in
Philip
v:T¥illiams,63
Williams,,3 a
sor."62
Philip Morris
j\1orris v.
widow brought a suit against Philip Morris for negligence
gence and deceit on behalf of her dead husband, a heavy
heavy
cigarette
smoker.34 The Court considered the appropricigarette smoker.64
ateness
ateness of a large jury award and ruled in a 5-4 decision
decision
that the Constitution's Due Process Clause
prohibits
the
Clause
use of punitive damage
damage awards to punish defendants for
harm inflicted on persons
persons who are not parties to the
suit. '65 Courts at the state level have rendered similar de-
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cisions.
clslOns. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court
recently ruled that the Punitive Damages
Damages Act ("PDA")
did not pernlit
permit a jury to consider
consider general
general deterrence
deterrence to
66
damages.6
punitive
others when awarding
damages.
This limitation on punitive damage
damage awards as a
acknowledges
means of retribution or deterrence tacitly acknowledges
that its place lies most firmly within the confines
confines of
of
criminal rather than civil law.
law. Regardless
Regardless of the use of
of
civil sanctions,
sanctions, a need remains for using criminal
criminal penalUnder
ties to achieve the societal goals of conformity.
confornlity. Under
the theory that individuals are most likely to regulate
their behavior
behavior out of fear of humiliation or loss of liberty, criminal sanctions
appropriate means to assanctions are an appropriate
sure that individuals
individuals behave within the rules of society.
Robert Nozick has posited that in order to safeguard against physical
physical harm, society must maintain "a
general
adequately remedied
general fear which cannot be adequately
remedied by
' 37 Nozick's notion is primarily based on
compensation."67
on
compensation."
68
model.68 According
the retributive
retributive mode1.
According to Professor Nozick,
criminal
criminal punishment is deserved under certain instances,
if not demandedi
demanded. 699 Professor Nozick
N ozide demonstrates
demonstrates this
formula; punishment deserved = rr* H,
H,
theory through a fornmla;
where H
H is the magnitude of the wrongness or harm, and
r
of responsibility. 70 Blameworthiness
Blameworthiness is a
r is the degree ofresponsibility.70
function of
the value ofthe
of the wrong done by the agent (ll)
(H)
ofthe
and the degree of the agent's responsibility
responsibility for the
wrongdoing (r).7l
(r).71 The value ofr may range from no responsibility
sponsibility (0),
(0), as when a criminal
criminal defendant is not
guilty by reason of insanity, to full responsibility
(1), as
responsibility (1),
72
the crime.
committed the
intentionally committed
when the defendant intentionally
crime.72
Professor
Professor Nozick's theory is particularly
particularly applicable to intentional
intentional wrongs. According
According to the theories
of corrective
corrective justice
justice and crimtort, the redistribution of
of
wealth from the intentional wrongdoer
wrongdoer to the victim can
properly.73
into behaving
arguably
arguably coerce the wrongdoer into
behaving properly.
73
However, what is absent from both theories is the stigma
that is attached to criminal punishment; Prof.
Prof. Nozick's
Nozick's
theory properly
properly accounts for the coercive
coercive value of
of
stigma. His formula indicates that the more responsible
74
punishment deserved.
the punishment
the wrongdoer
wrongdoer is, the greater
greater the
deserved. 74
To the extent that punishment
punishment is viewed on a sliding
scale-from
scale-from probation to monetary
monetary obligations to a loss
of
liberty-certainly the latter is the most compelling
ofliberty-certainly
compelling to
ensure
conformity. Defendants
ensure social confornlity.
Defendants who commit torts
must balance the financial penalty against the personal
personal
value gained from committing the wrong. In contrast,
criminal punishment
thereby
punishment stigmatizes
stigmatizes the individual, thereby
imposing a larger punishment and a greater disincentive
7
particular acts.
to engaging in those particular
acts. 751
According to Professor
According
Professor Nozick, criminal punish-
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"a communicative
communicative act transmitting
ment is "a
transmitting to the wrong- stead, proof of the plaintiff's injury is mandatory, and
was";76 punishment will as such, is a prerequisite
doer ... how wrong his conduct was";6
prerequisite to liability.84
doer...
liability.14 The act must be a
communicate
community that such con- voluntary
voluntary act-one
act-one in which the actor chooses to encommunicate clearly to the community
duct is intolerable.7
involuntary act-conduct
intolerable. 77 The deterrent
gage. 85 An involuntary
deterrent value served by an
an gage."
act-conduct engaged in while
individual's
otherwise unconscious-is
unconscious-is not sufficient.
individual's fear of stigmatization
stigmatization is often appropriate one is otherwise
sufficient."86 Thus,
as it may serve as a "system
communication an individual who hits a child while driving a car due to
"system for public communication
7
-----------------ofvalues."78
an epileptic
of
values." 1
epileptic fit does not commit a
Like two branches from Tort law sa ctions can- conscious
conscious act
act8877 whereas one who
makes a conscious
the same trunk,
tmnk, the law has proconscious choice to swing
niot m~atch t he reputa- a fist does. 888
vided for criminal
criminal and civil relief
from intentional harms to the indi{iOfi of
Perhaps the most confusing
riminal
C
aspect
vidual. The sanctions for both
aspect of this process
process is proving
proving the
criminal
pulishrne it as an ef- actor's desire to engage
criminal and civil wrongs are unengage in the conderstandably
fective me "S of regUl- duct such that it subsequently
subsequently
derstandably blurred as similar
theories are often used to attribute
brings about the intended
intended result, as
blame and assess compensation.
be1i vior. For opposed
opposed to intending the result itHuge tort awards continue to usurp
this reasoi
self.
The Restatement (Second) of
self. The Restatement (Second) of
societyls Torts
the role of retribution and deterprovides the best illustration
illustration
wVell-serve d
rence, both of which were previ"[IJfthe
of the element act. "[I]f
the actor,
ously reserved for criminal is{enceof b 0
having pointed a pistol at another,
hcriminal pulls
pulls the
trigger, the
is the
punishment. However, while tort
the trigger,
the act
act is
the
law can effectively
prohibit
indianrd
civil
d(
effectively
rinitions for pulling of the trigger and not the
d
viduals from repeating particular
particular
impingement of
bullet upon the
the bullet
of the
-itentionimpingement
Ihe S me
other person.",,
person. "89 If the act is to pull
types of conduct, the non-codified
non-codified
ad hoc nature of tort law does little
wrc [lgSthe trigger, the intent would be the
actor's desired
desired goal that he or she
to accomplish
accomplish the most important
role of communicating a system of shared
values
that
wishes to achieve
achieve by pulling that trigger. According
According to
shared
define the boundaries within which individuals
individuals should Prosser, intent in this context means
live their lives. Tort law sanctions cannot match the rep(1) ...
utation of criminal punishment
punishment as an effective means of
of
... a state of mind (2) about conseconseregulating behavior. For this reason, society is wellquences of an act (or omission) and not
regulating
served
by
the
existence
of
both
criminal
and
civil
defiabout the act itself, and (3) it extends not
served
existence
criminal
only to having in the mind a purpose
(or
purpose (or
nitions for the same intentional wrongs.
desire) to bring about given consequences but also to having in mind a beB. The Criminalized Torts: Assault,
lief ((or
given
Battery and False Imprisonment
Imprisonment
or knowledge)
know ledge) that gIven
consequences
substantially certain
consequences are substantially
certain to
torts,"
result from the act9
acUO0
William Prosser identified
identified four "dignitary torts,"
which are intentional
intentional harms against the individual: assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional inflic- In order to prove intent, the actor must show that the de79 These wrongs all require fendant chose to commit a particular
tion of emotional distress. 79
particular action, and in so
proof that the defendant chose to engage in the tortious doing, intended or knew with substantial
substantial certainty that
conduct and that, by engaging in such conduct, intended
intended such an action would bring about the undesired result. 9911
or knew with substantial
substantial certainty that the conduct The actor who pulls the trigger for the desired
desired purpose
enjoyment'( of causing harm to a particular
would invade an individual's right to quiet enjoyment.80
particular person is said to intend
Three of these torts-assault, battery,
battery, and false impris- such conduct.9
conduct.92 The actor who pulls the trigger for enonment-also
exist
in
criminal
law.8
joyment
purposes only,
onment-also
law. 81
only, but does so in a crowded area,
Much has been written about the conduct
intended such conduct for purposes
conduct or el- is also said to have intended
2
82
emental
emental act of intentional torts.
tortS. Unlike criminal
criminal law, of proving intentional torts since the actor knew with
the act itself is not merely an element of the tort. 833 In- substantial
substantial certainty
certainty that such conduct
conduct would bring

lating

by the ex-
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about the undesired
wrong.,, This requirement of intent
undesired wrong.93
94
torts. 94
all intentional tortS.
for
is the prerequisite
i.i.

The Intentional
Intentional Tort of
ofAssault

An actor is liable for tortious assault if "he acts
intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with
the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension
apprehension of such contact, and (b) the other is
apprehension." 95 In other
thereby put in such imminent apprehension."95
words, an assault is the threat of harmful or offensive
contact
contact coupled with the present ability to commit
commit a
harmfuil or offensive
hamlful
offensive contact. Assault occurs
occurs in the absence
sence of contact;
contact; therefore, assault would be actionable
on the basis of a mental,
mental, rather than physical, type of
of
96
96
harm.
haml.
Proof of assault merely requires some apprehension of fear on the part of the plaintiff,
plaintiff; physical harm is
of the tort. The fear need not be extreme;
not an element ofthe
proof of fright or humiliation suffices to support a cause
97 For example,
of action. 97
example, standing
standing within striking distance of another while shaking
shaking a stick is assault; shaking
that same stick with the same force behind the victim,
who is therefore unaware of such actions, is not.
Even the most offensive and off-putting words,
alone, are never sufficient
sufficient to support an assault claim,
regardless of the mental anguish the words may impose. 9988 Thus, in Lay v.v. Kremer,
Kremer,9999 the defendant,
defendant, while
fighting over a parking spot, called a woman
woman a "motherflicking
acquitted
fucking nigger"* and a "bitch"; the trial court acquitted
the defendant under the premise that "mere words [did]
' ° Assault actions are generally
"1
not constitute assault.
assault."lOo
successful,
successful, it seems, when there is proof that the plaintiff
plaintiff
suffered
suffered some degree of fear or mental anguish resulting
from his or her belief that the defendant had a present
1°1
capacity
capacity to inflict physical harm.
harm. 101
ii.

(b) a harmful
harmftul contact with the other perresults,104 or (c)
directly or indirectly results,l°
son directly
(c)
he acts intending to cause a harmful or
or
offensive
offensive contact
contact with another or third
of
imminent apprehension
person or an imminent
apprehension of
1
1
(d) an offensive
such a contact,105
contact, and (d)
contact with the other person directly or
or
contact
indirectly results. lOG
indirectly
10

Tort of Battery
Battery
The Intentional
Intentional Tort

Battery
Battery is an assault coupled with contact
contact that is
102
Restatement (Second) of
harmful or offensive.102
offensive. The Restatement
of
Torts has divided battery into two categories:
one
in
categories:
which harmftul
harmful contact results, and another in which fensive contact results.
results.l°0103 According
According to the Restatement,
Restatement, an
an
actor is liable for battery
battery if:
if:
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful
or offensive
offensive contact with the person of
of
the other or a third person
person or an immiapprehension of such a contact and
nent apprehension
Criina Law Brief

Battery requires proof of the exact same intent
°
as assault. 1071
The difference
difference lies in the contact. Assault occurs
in the absence
absence of contact, whereas battery
battery requires some
1
actionable.
be
to
order
sort of contact
contact in
actionable. 1088
Another relevant distinction
distinction exists between the
two wrongs. In order for assault to be actionable,
actionable, the
9
109
plaintiff must be aware of the threat.10
threat. However, battery
plaintiff. Thus,
requires no awareness
awareness on the part
pmi of the plaintiff.
if a defendant
defendant raises a stick behind a plaintiff's back and
plaintiff, even if the plaintiff
the stick hits the plaintiff,
plaintiff did not realize the stick was raised, the defendant's conduct
conduct is actionable under battery.
Battery is not necessarily considered a crime of
of
mental anguish, primarily because the element of
of
the crime.110
for the
contact-is required for
harm -or at least contact-is
haml-or
crime. 110
Courts
COUlis have, however, considered
considered offensive contact actionable when the plaintiff suffered humiliation or embarrassment.111
barrassment. 111 This recovery for embarrassment
embarrassment has
extended
boundaries of battery to include emotional
extended the boundaries
emotional
injury, in addition to physical injury.
iii.
iii.

The Intentional
IntentionalTort of
Imprisonment.
ofFalse
False Imprisonment.

False imprisonment,
imprisonment, sometimes referred to as
as
false arrest,
another's
atTest, is the intentional deprivation of another's
liberty. According
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
false imprisonment
imprisonment occurs when an actor intends to
"confine
within boundaries
boundaries fixed by the actor,
"confine another
another within
and his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the other, and the other is conscious of the
by it."112
confinement
it."112
confinement or is harmed by
While common law cases pemlitted
pernitted an action for
false imprisonment
imprisonment in instances where the plaintiff was
unaware of his confinement,
unaware
confinement, the current formulation requires proof that the plaintiff realize his liberty is restrained.1"
strained.113 Thus, false imprisonment, which is an
infringement
infringement on the plaintiff's
plaintiff's belief that he is not free
to exercise his will to move about-like
about-like assault-is
assault-is a
anguish."'114
wrong against mental anguish.
The intent element of false imprisonment
imprisonment is very

*The author
authorand the editors
deliberated whether to redact language from cases that many people
*The
editors deliberated
people
will find
We decided
full, as best support for
articles's larger
larger
for the articles's
in full,
decided to
to pubish the words in
will
find offensive.
offensive. We
claims,
HeinOnline -- 5 Crim. L. Brief 37 2009
claims.

similar to that of assault and battery.11
battery. 1155 In order to be responsible
sponsible for false imprisonment,
imprisonment, the defendant must
must
know that he is confining another or be substantially
substantially cerconduct will result in confinement.116
tain that his conduct
confinement. 116 Mental anguish is, in essence, the chief component of false
imprisonment.
imprisonment. Under the Restatement
Restatement formulation, the
plaintiff is not required
to
suffer any type of physical
required
physical
harm; rather, the defendant must only instill in the plain17
There
tiff a sense of loss of freedom to move about.1
about. 117
must only be a sense of boundaries. Such boundaries
"large or small, visible or tangible, or through
may be "large
real, still conception
only."1l8 Thus, in Allen v.
v. Frome,
Frome,11919
conception only.""8
the court held that false imprisonment
imprisonment occurred
occUlTed in a city
0
town.1
leave
to
in which the defendant
defendant felt unable
town. 120 Similarly, courts have found that one can be falsely impris1 1
oned in a car that moves about.
about. 1212
C.

Corresponding Crimes
The Corresponding

corresponds
corresponds quite closely with the MPC's definition
definition of
of
purposeful
actor's
purposeful and knowingly. Thus, proof of the actor's
awareness
awareness is virtually
virtually identical
identical in each instance.

i.i.

The Crimes
Crimes of
Assault and
and Battery
afAssault

Assault and battery-common
battery-common law misdemeanors-exist today as statutory
meanors-exist
statutory crimes in all AmeriAmeri132
can jurisdictions.13
jurisdictions.
Although the two crimes are
generally
generally said in one breath, it is important
important to note that
they are actually distinguishable
distinguishable and are divided in the
same
same way as their tort counterparts.113313 Like the tort, the
crime of battery requires an injury
injury or offensive touching,
1 whereas
ing,134
whereas assault requires
requires no physical contact."
contact. 135
a.

The Crime of Assault

Various statutory formulations of the crime of
of
136
assault
assault exist.116
exist. These statutes
statutes can be divided into two
general
general categories:
categories: assault as an intentional scaring or
or
7
assault
battery.1 Assault, as an intenassault as an attempted battery.137
true codification of civil assault.
assault.-138
tional scaring, is the tme
For this type of assault, one is criminally responsible
when he or she carries out some behavior that causes an
an
apprehension
apprehension of immediate
immediate bodily
bodily harm with the intent
139 Pointing a gun at another
apprehension.131
to cause such apprehension.
another
individual
is
sufficient
to
establish
common
law
asindividual
common
140
sault.141
criminalizes the
sault. Under this formulation,
fommlation, assault criminalizes
imposition of mental fear or anguish.
In some states, evidence of mental anguish can
support
assault 14411 and
support the personal
personal injury requirement of assau!tJ
can include evidence that the victim was upset during
or after the assault, needed
psychological
needed subsequent
subsequent psychological
treatment, was unable
unable to conduct
conduct a normal life, feared
feared
for the his or her safety, and maintained
maintained continuing feelvulnerability.N
ings of vulnerability.
1"2
The MPC fommlation
formulation of assault constitutes
constitutes a
misdemeanor in three circumstances:
misdemeanor
circumstances: where the actor attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly, or recklessly
causes bodily injury; negligently
negligently causes bodily injury
with a deadly weapon; and attempts by physical
physical menace
143
harm. 143
imminent serious bodily
to put another in fear of imminent
bodily harm.
This third circumstance
circumstance incorporates
incorporates the civil notion of
of
assault
assault into the criminal law, as had been done in a ma144
was drafted.
jority of jurisdictions at the time the
the MPC
MPC was
drafted. 144

Criminal
Criminal law assigns blame to those who engage
in intentional
intentional conduct. Like tort law, criminal convicconvictions require proof that the defendant
defendant chose to engage
engage
in conduct and that, by engaging in that conduct, intended or knew with substantial
substantial certainty
certainty that the conduct would result in a wrong against society.122
society.1 While
criminal
criminal law also assigns punishment
punishment to those who acted
acted
recklessly or negligently,
13
the
law
seems
to
reserve
the
negligently,123
greatest
greatest punishment
punishment for those who engage
engage in intention12
1
conduct.
ally wrongful
12"
Much has been
been made of the intent levels in criminal
law. Early on-and
inallaw.
on-and still in many jurisdictions-injurisdictions-in2
1
intent.1125
and general
tent was divided between
between specific and
general intent.
Courts define
define specific intent as an actual purpose
purpose or goal
conduct or a deliberate
to engage in a particular
particular type of conduct
choice
harm. 12
choice to ignore
ignore a certainty of haml.
126 General
General intent
carelessness on
translates into a sense of risk-taking or carelessness
on
127
the part of the defendant. 127
The Model
Penal Code ("MPC") has created
created
A10del Penal
four classifications
classifications of an actor's mindset as a means to
better delineate between
between specific
specific and general intent: purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent.
negligent.121
128 "Purpose"Purposeful"
is
defined
as
a
conscious
goal
to
engage
in
ful"
defined
conscious
in
9
particular
"knowing" requires
proof
particular conduct,12
conduct,129 while "knowing"
requires proof
that the defendant was substantially certain
certain that such a
result would occur
occur from a particular type of conduct."'
conduct. 130
The torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment
imprisonment require proof of intent similar to general
general intent
b. The Crime of Battery
intent in that
that the
actor is responsible ifhe
if he or she intended the conduct
conduct or
or
outcom
Just as in tort law, the common
knew with substantial certainty
certainty that such an outcom
common law crime of batoccur.11313 The Restatement's
Restatement's definition of intent tery requires harmful or offensive touching.145
would occur.
touching. 145 Battery,
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like assault, requires proof of an act or an omission and hann
harm resulting from it.
"1599 Stated another way, IIED
it."15
IED oc116
1
a mental state. "6 Many jurisdictions
jurisdictions allow for both in- curs when "[0
"[o]ne
]ne who by extreme and outrageous contentional
battery. 147 Intentional battery duct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
tentional and unintentional
unintentional battery.147
emotional
typically requires
requires proof of purposeful
purposeful conduct."8
conduct. 1"8 For
For distress to another is subject to liability for such emoexample,
example, one who-with intent to injure-acts
injure-acts or omits tional distress, and if
if bodily harm to the other results
' 0
to act when he has a duty to act, which is the legal cause from it,
it, for such bodily harm. "160
IIED sanctions those
of an injury, is guilty of criminal
criminal battery.
whose conduct is so outrageous that it brings about menBattery is not a separate
separate crime
crime under the MPC, tal and/or physical pain and suffering.
suffering.11611 Additionally,
which has synthesized
synthesized the common law crimes of may- IIED is the only intentional tort that allows recovery
recovery
hem, battery, and assault into a single offense.11"99 One from one whose goal is limited to creating emotional
emotional
who attempts to cause serious bodily injury or one who hax
oc.
havoc.
The tort of IIED is relatively new, as compared
compared
causes such injury purposely, knowingly, or recklessly,
and under circumstances
indif- to the traditional common law torts of assault, battery
circumstances manifesting an extreme
extreme indifference
commit bat- and false imprisonment, all of which date back to before
ference to the value of human life is said to commit
0
tery.150
tery. 15
the Sixteenth
Sixteenth Century.162
Century. 162 T¥ilkinson
Downton,1633 a late
Wilkinson v.v. Downton,11
The MPC codifies
"ag- nineteenth
nineteenth century
presented the first instance
century case, presented
codifies civil battery and calls it "aggravated
gravated assault."1,
assault."151 According
According to the MPC, a person is when a court allowed recovery for a woman, against
guilty of aggravated
aggravated assault if he
whom a mean-spirited
mean-spirited practical joke
"attempts
to
cause
serious
bodily
was played. As a consequence
of
"attempts to cause serious
inconsequence of
the joke, the woman suffered
jury to another, or causes such injury
The tort Cf IlED is
suffered "viopurposely, knowingly or recklessly
relativel Siiew, as
shock to
lent shock
system,
nervous system,
her nervous
to her
lent
producing
committing
and other
circumstances manifesting
under circumstances
other
serious and
and permanent
compared to the tra- more
indifference to the value of
extreme
extreme indifference
more serious
pernlanent physiphysilife."152 The level of harm ditionial co xi nOi lawx
human life."152
of
entailing weeks of
consequences entailing
cal consequences
necessary to show "serious
"serious bodily
suffering and incapacity
incapacity . . .to. "164
r4
necessary
The
the plaintiff
plaintiffto
reinjury"
tis of aS ,auit, batThe court
court allowed
allowed the
to reinjury" varies by jurisdiction, and
can range from "reddish
"reddish marks tery and ft lse impris- cover for the harm she suffered
suffered as a
around
of the
defendant's
around the neck" from a potential
result of
the defendant's practical
result1165
_whiCh1
65
Of
I
15 to extreme physical pain
a
Oni-nent,
choking
joke.
choking153
physical pain
and disfigurement. 15"
15
date bac 1 to before
Almost 150 years after
after
ti
IIED appeared
;h century. Wilkinson, the tort of lIED
sixtee
the
ImFalse
c. The Crime of
in a 1948 supplement
of the Restateof False Imsupplement ofthe
166 The California
ment of Torts.
Torts.",'
California
prisonment
Supreme Court first applied the ReFalse imprisonment
definition four years later when it decided
decided
imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of
of statement's
statement's definition
another's
State Rubbish
Rubbish Collectors
'n v.
another's liberty.15
liberty.155 At common law, the offense could the landmark
Collectors Ass 'n
v.
landmark case of State
15
156
be committed
by
mere
words.
6
The
gravamen
of
the
SiliznoJ
137
Courts
across
the
country
followed Califorcommitted
gravamen
Siliznojp67
recognized the incrime is that the victim believes
believes he is unable to remove nia's lead, and today every state has recognized
1
7 Mere words dependent
Restatement
"adopted [the] Restatement
himself from the control of the defendant. 157
dependent IIED tort and "adopted
are insufficient to constitute
form."16
constitute false imprisonment if the (Second) of Torts section 46 in some fornl."168
person to whom they are spoken is not deprived of freeLike assault, battery, and false imprisonment,
an
imprisonment, an
dom of action. 11585
individual is responsible for IIED
IED if
if it is his intention to
to
inflict severe emotional distress or he knows with substantial ce11ainty
certainty that severe emotional distress will arise
169 Under the Restatement
as a
conduct.9
a result of such conduct.
Restatement
approach, the defendant must not only intentionally
intentionally
cause severe emotional distress, but such conduct must
According to the Restatement, one who inten- also be deemed "extreme
"extreme and outrageous."170
outrageous.." 17° The ReAccording
emotional distress to another
tionally causes severe emotional
another is statements have never attempted
attempted to provide aa definition
liable "(a)
"(a) for such emotional distress, and (b) for bodily of "outrageous"
"outrageous" conduct, stating rather that something
Criminal Law Brief
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the other intentional torts, it would seem consistent to
IIED. Criminalizing IIED
lIED would further the
member of the community would...
would ... lead [the person] criminalize lIED.
member
particu"Outrageous !" ' 171 Scholars and courts, how- retributive and deterrent goals of punishment, pm-ticuto exclaim, "Outrageous!"171
ever,
ever, agree that liability for this tort is reserved for the larly at aatime when new technology communicates outseverest cases where the defendant's conduct goes "behon-endous conduct for which there
"be- rageous and even horrendous
law. Society
Society
yond all possible bounds of decency
.. to be regarded
regarded seems no viable punishment in criminal law.
decency ...
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized comcom- will benefit from criminalizing the intentional use of exmunity. ' 172 "Liability
"Liability..,
munity."172
... does not extend to mere insults, treme and outrageous conduct. Such conduct is rare, but
is
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or to the extent that it results in intolerable wrongs, it is
7
of
criminal
worthy
punishment.
other trivialities."1
trivialities."1731 As a
a result, severe emotional dis"the distress inflicted is
tress can be found only when "the
is
A. Similarities Between
Between IIED
lIED and the
so severe that no reasonable person could be expected
Criminalized Intentional
Intentional Torts
Criminalized
it."174
to endure it."174
is outrageous if
if "the
"the recitation of the facts to an average

The modern
modern formulation of IIED permits a
a
plaintiff to recover for injuries resulting from aa defendant's intentional use of extreme and outrageous conduct ifif that conduct results in mental anguish or physical
harm. A logical formulation of the proposed crime
would be patterned after the 1948 Restatement
Restatement of Torts.
Thus, an actor would be subject to criminal prosecution
ifif he purposely or knowingly caused emotional distress
through extreme and outrageous conduct thereby causing mental anguish or psychic injury. The conduct must
"beyond all possible bounds of
of
be so extreme as to go "beyond
decency,"
and
"the
mental
decency,"
"the
anguish suffered by plaintiff
a nature that no reasonable per[must be] serious and of a
'175
it.
son could be expected to
to endure
endure it."17)
Like the criminalized torts of assault and false
imprisonment,
imprisonment, the criminalized version of IIED would
penalize aadefendant when a
a victim suffers emotional or
psychic damage as aa consequence of the defendant's intentional conduct. Criminalized IIED would also result
in the same type of physical harm that is required for
proof of the prima facie elements of the criminalized
criminalized tort
of battery. The commonality
commonality of the harm caused by a
a
different type of conduct supports criminal punishment
punishment
for IIED.
IIED.
Neuroscientific evidence supports the conclusion that verbal assaults can manifest themselves in
physical pain.
pain.176
176 Thus, where one assaults another with
outrageous verbal comments,
comments, the plaintiff might ultimately experience physical pain. This intentional infliction of physical pain is the type of harm that society
seeks to punish through the crime of battery.
IED creates the same type ofhann
of harm as soSince IIED
ciety has sought to redress through criminalization of
of

The proposed criminalization of
lIED would reofIIED
quire proof of the same type of intent as the other criminalized intentional torts. 177
17 Like assault, battery, and
false imprisonment, the state can only seek punishment
punishment
for lIED, and a
a plaintiff can only recover for the IIED,
lIED,
upon proof that the defendant intended to cause the
harm or was substantially certain that harm would result
17
from his conduct. 178
, But while the intent and the harm
are the same, the act of lIED,
IIED, use of extreme and outrageous conduct, is distinct from the other criminalized
intentional torts.
Once the conduct is proven, it is incumbent upon
the prosecution to prove that harm resulted from that
conduct. Harm
Harn1 can be both mental and physical. The
mental anguish that is punishable through the criminalized torts of assault and false imprisonment is equally
79
infliction of
present in intentional infliction
of emotional
emotional distress.1
distress. 179
A tortfeasor is only responsible for IIED if his actions
Prosser
were the proximate cause of a psychic injury.
injury.18ISO Prosser
calls both assault and false imprisonment crimes of
of
mental anguish. It seems,
seems, then, that mental anguish,
which the law seeks to curb, is equally present in
181
lIED.lsl
IIED.
The pain inflicted through lIED
IIED can result in the
type of harm criminalized in battery. The crime of batHarm can
tery involves proof of direct physical harim.
harm. 11822 Harm
include aa gunshot wound,183
wound,- a
a kick upon another,184
another,ls4 or
or
something as slight as intentionally blowing smoke in
15
another's face.
When recovering for lIED, many jufaceY)
risdictions require proof of severe physical manifesta186 In doing so, the law
tions of emotional harm.16
recognizes that extreme and outrageous conduct can indeed cause the type of harm that is recoverable through
the other criminalized torts.
New scientific research supports the conclusion
meted
that the extreme
extreme and outrageous verbal conduct meted
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out through
through verbal assaults can inflict the same type of
of
physical harm that is prohibited by criminal battery.
Neuroscientific
N
euroscientific studies show that verbal
verbal abuse can bring
about physical symptoms, which in turn cause physical
1877 Actual measurable
pain.18
measurable neurochemical
neurochemical changes can
pain.
occur in the amygdala-the
amygdala-the part of the brain that performs a primary
primary role in processing
processing emotional reactions-when an individual
individual is verbally
verbally assaulted or
or
8
experiences
experiences some other type of emotional
emotional trauna.1
trauma. 188 The
amygdala
amygdala instantly responds by inducing
inducing a series of
of
physiologic reactions including rapid heart rate, palpitations, sweating
sweating and increased blood flow to large muscle groups.189
groups.18 9 These physiological changes in the brain,
which occur congruently with emotional harm,
ham1, become
a fom1
form of physical pain, from which the victim clearly

to criminalize
criminalize lIED.
punishment lies in
IIED. The need for punishment
IIED is markedly differthe fact that the act element
element of lIED
ent from assault, battery and false imprisonment; more
importantly, punishment for this type of act does not re96
ally exist in most jurisdictions.1
jurisdictions. 196

penalize the actor who inAssault and battery
battery penalize
harm. Pointing a gun and
tends to cause direct physical ham1.
missing satisfies the act element
element of assault. Pointing a
gun and hitting satisfies the act element
element of battery or aggravated
gravated assault. The act element of false imprisonment
imprisonment
is satisfied by the actor who voluntarily chooses to confine another or to make one feel confined. For example,
locking car doors and speeding
speeding can satisfy the act eleele197
imprisonment.197
ment of false imprisonment.
The act element of IIED
lIED requires
requires proof of ex9
suffers. 190(
Chertoff,
suffers.
treme and outrageous
outrageous conduct. In Rissman v.v. Chertoff,
demonstrating the relationship
between a transportation
transportation safety expert whose superiors constantly
constantly
Studies demonstrating
relationship between
psychological
"scolded
psychological and verbal abuse and disorders such as screamed
screamed at him for being
being too thorough and "scolded
he were a terrorist in a poorly writdepression, anxiety, and post-traumatic
post-traumatic stress disorder [him] for hours as if
ifhe
(PTSD) further support the conclusion that IIED can re- ten 'B'
'B' movie script"
script" provided
provided sufficient
sufficient evidence to
19
8
sult in the type of physical harm which criminal law prove IIED.
lIED.198 With this fact pattern, the courts could
could
not
find
an
actionable
seeks to curb by punishing for battery or aggravated
claim
for
assault,
battery
or
even
aggravated aseven
actionable
sault. A person suffering from depression may also suf- false imprisonment. Only if lIED
IIED were criminalized
criminalized
fer from "persistent aches or pains, headaches, cramps could the TSA supervisors
supervisors be punished
punished for their behavor digestive problems..."
problems ... " according to the National In- ior.
IOr.
In Gomez v.v. Hug,199
Hug,199 a supervisor at a county fairstitute of Mental Health. 19191 Exacerbating
Exacerbating this disease
through a verbal assault can result in more severe
severe phys- grounds, upon seeing an employee enter his office, said
said
ical symptoms
office'?" 200
00 "A
"[w Jhat is that fucking spic doing in the office'?"
symptoms that often accompany anxiety disorders "[w]hat
include
include "fatigue,
"fatigue, headaches, muscle tension, muscle fucking Mexican
Mexican greaser like you, that is all you are.
aches, difficulty swallowing, trembling, twitching, ilTiirri- You are nothing but a Mexican
Mexican greaser, nothing but a
20 1
shit.'" The badgering
badgering continued and, as a contability, sweating, nausea, lightheadedness,
lightheadedness, having to go
go pile of shit."201
sequence,
bathroom frequently, feeling out of breath, and sequence, the victim suffered mental anguish that reto the bathroom
flashes." 192
hot flashes."l92
sulted
"serious medical problems"
problems" that precluded
sulted in "serious
precluded him
him
202
In other instances, while the outrageous
working202 Under these facts, a state would be unoutrageous conduct
conduct from working.
of IIED
lIED might not immediately cause physical pain, spe- able to punish for assault. It is long held that assault is
cific studies confirm that, despite the non-physical
non-physical na- not actionable
actionable unless the victim is placed in imminent
ture of verbal abuse, abuse from lIED
IIED can be as
apprehension of immediate
as apprehension
immediate bodily harm. Here, the ver1933 In 1990,
damaging
1990, Psychologists bal
lashings and demeaning
damaging as physical harm. 19
ballashings
demeaning behavior
behavior does not give rise
conducted a to a fear of harm. Battery would also not be actionable
Nicole M. Capezza
Capezza and Ximena B. Arriaga conducted
study, in which they found that seventy-two
seventy-two percent
percent of
of since defendant did not touch or intend to touch the vic234 female victims of both physical
physical and psychological
psychological tim. Nor would false imprisonment apply as there is no
abuse indicated
that
they
were
more
negatively
indicated
negatively im- evidence
evidence that the victim was unable to escape. In this
pacted by the psychological
psychological abuse than the physical
scenario, the defendant could not be criminally
criminally punphysical scenario,
194
abuse. 194 Regarding their findings, the authors stated, ished. If lIED
IIED were criminalized, however, the defen"[t]he
penalties, as a reasonable jury
"[t]he results obtained in the present study clearly indi- dant could be subjected to penalties,
conclude that his conduct
cate that psychological
conduct was extreme,
extreme, outrapsychological [abuse] is, with some variations, might conclude
as detrimental to women's mental health as is physical geous and beyond
the
bounds
of
decency.
beyond
violence."195
violence." 9
B. Advancing
The seemingly similar requirements
requirements of intent
Advancing the Goals of Punishment
Punishment
and harm beg the question of why it would be necessary
necessary
Criminal Law Brief
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or cyber bullying. Criminalizing
Criminalizing the use of spoken
spoken and
another
written words that cause severe damage to another
would fall within society's goal to provide citizens with
a reasonable expectation
expectation of quiet enjoyment
enjoyment and liberty.
Verbal abuse is not afforded
afforded the same treatment
under the criminal law as physical abuse. 22121 Many jucriminalize verbal abuse. In those that
risdictions do not criminalize
213
do, it is under
under the guise of harassment. 213
Yet verbal
well-being.214
personal
one's
on
abuse is a serious assault
personal well-being. 214
confirm that verbal abuse often
Additionally, studies confiml
often
leads to physical abuse.215
abuse.21 Criminalizing verbal abuse
WFhat to Punish
would serve to prevent the commission
commission of a greater
i.i. What
Punish
greater
crime.216
crime. 216
lIED,
Jurisdictions
Applying the proposed criminal
criminal statute for nED,
Jurisdictions criminalize
criminalize a variety of acts as a
Rissman and Hug
Hug could be subject to means to prevent
the perpetrators
perpetrators in Rissman
prevent that future harm.
haml. Conspiracy, stalking,
criminal punishment. In the first hypothetical, the su- and loitering are all inchoate
inchoate crimes that allow police to
pervisor hurled racial epithets at the
constitutionally intervene
constitutionally
intervene potenactivity. 217
criminal activity.217
employee
By ado Sting the
tially greater criminal
employee to the point where the emFor
ployee suffered physical
physical and emoF
or instance,
instance, an agreement
agreement to comharm.20203 A significant
uiexvest ci 1minalized mit a criminal act, which is conspirtional harm.
significant number
of states and federal courts have held
prosecuted on its own,
Stort, jur.is- acy, can be prosecuted
in
one
by
that racial epithets shouted
even if the agreed-upon, contemshouted by one in
contema position of power over another are
dictions would be
plated crime never comes to
evidence
fruition.21,
evidence of extreme outrageous
outrageous confmition.218 When considering
considering punTessage
ishing verbal
abuse, IIED
duct.
Anbio EngineerS dIi ng f
ishing
verbal abuse,
ducu2o404 In Alcorn v.v Anbro
EngineernED could
could be
2
ing,
, 0 the Supreme
Supreme Court of
that conIC uct which seen as a similar inchoate act, aling, Inc. ,205
l v
lowing police intervention
California
Meitaf
Califomia held that an employee
employee had
intervention before
111fl
aeS
O11
the
verbal
violence
translates into
sufficiently
IIED because
because his
sufficiently alleged
alleged nED
the verbal violence translates
into
supervisor
supervisor shouted racial epithets and others' frE edom from physical harm.
2
fired him.
06 The court found it sigSigharmisi
him.206
tolrabe.
Criminalizing
IIED would also
Criminalizing lIED
r
Sto
lerabl
h
provide
meaningful
to
provide meaningful punishment
punishment to
nificant that the person harassing the
plaintiff was "standing
"standing in a position
the crime of cyber stalking. In Lori
27
or relation
1 In Shuman
Shuman v.
relation of authority
authority over plaintiff."
plaintiff."207
v. Drew's case, the defendant imparted words, that on their
their
Co.,28 a federal district court face, were seemingly
seemingly innocuous. The defendant
defendant secured
American Home Assurance CO.,208
secured
found that a defendant
"repeatedly made racial a "My
Space" page
defendant who "repeatedly
"My Space"
page under a false name and then preslurs directed at Plaintiff based upon his Arab ancestry, tended that she was a teenage boy with a crush
cmsh on the
13
year-old
girl.
219
The
calling him names such as "Fucking
woman later sent spiteful mes"Fucking Arab" and "Fuck219
ing Carpet Salesman,"
Salesman," which slurs "caused,
"caused, and were sages to the girl, including one that said "the world
intended by to cause, Plaintiff's
emotional distress"
distress" would be a better place without yoU."220
you." 220 A reasonable
Plaintiff's emotional
21
committed
circumstances that Ms. Drew's
committed lIED.
lIED.2099 Under
Under this analysis, the defendant jury could find under the circumstances
in Hug used language
conduct went beyond the bounds of decency. In fact,
language outrageous enough to be action- conduct
accounts report that the jury wanted to convict Ms.
new
able.
The plaintiff in Hug also presented evidence of
Drew of felonies that would allow punishment of up to
of Drew
221
serious medical problems. Many jurisdictions require twenty years in prison.
prison .1
However, the available laws
222
2lo did not support their desired
harm.210
goal.222
emotional harm.
desired goal.
proof of a physical
physical manifestation
manifestation of
of emotional
evidence to
internet communication
criminalAssuming there was significant
significant medical evidence
While intemet
communication is not criminal211
ized
under
IIED,
internet
communication
show
a
manifestation
of
can
lead to a
physical
harm,
the
state
would
show manifestation
lIED, intemet communication
harm,211
would
be able to prove IIED.
claim for a criminal
criminal case of harassment. For example,
lIED.
Criminalizing
Criminalizing IIED
lIED would also permit punish- in the instance where a woman posted a call for sexually
ment in other instances, including
including verbal domestic abuse explicit
explicit favors and listed a neighbor's
neighbor's phone number,
Criminalizing
IIED would advance
advance the goals of
Criminalizing lIED
of
society's
adoptsociety's interest in curbing harmful conduct. By
Byadopting the newest criminalized
criminalized intentional tort, jurisdictions
would be sending a message that conduct which mentally infringes on others'
others' freedom from harm is intolerable. Punishment
Punishment would allow society to seek just
deserts from those who engage in acts that are outrageous by traditional standards. Moreover, punishing
IIED
nED would send a message to individuals and the general population that such conduct is intolerable.
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of hathe Suffolk County New York police filed charges
charges ofharassment against the woman.223
woman. 221 Under New York state
law, "[a]
"[a] person is guilty of aggravated
aggravated harassment
harassment in
the second degree
degree when, with intent to harass, annoy,
she...
threaten or alarm another
another person, he or she
... (b) causes
a communication
communication to be initiated by mechanical
mechanical or electronic means or otherwise
otherwise with a person, anonymously
or otherwise, by telephone, by telegraph, or by mail, or
or
by transmitting
delivering any other form of written
transmitting or delivering
written
communication,
communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance ....
...."224
224 Here, the woman could be successfully prosecuted
ecuted for harassment
harassment since she initiated
initiated phone calls
likely to cause annoyance. The maximum punishment
for this crime
25 However,
crime is up to one year in prison. 225
the permissible penalty should be more severe.
The type of harm caused in this instance, assuming that the harm resulted in severe mental harm, would
would
be more on par with New York's second degree assault
statute,
criminalizes conduct
statute, which criminalizes
conduct when a person inseriousphysical
physical injury and
tends to and actually causes serious
causes such injury. Second degree assault is punishable
as a class D F
Felony,
seven
dony, for a term
tern1 not to exceed seven
years.226
years. 226 Thus, even though the mental anguish caused
caused
by the harassing
equivalent to
harassing phone calls could be the equivalent
physical harm, New York's second degree assault statute
would not allow for such conduct
conduct to be prosecuted as a
second
degree
assault.
Absent
criminalization of IIED,
second degree
criminalization
lIED,
sentenced to a
the offender in this case would only be sentenced
maximum of one year in prison, no matter how severe
the mental harm.
Criminalizing
IIED would provide a means to
Criminalizing lIED
impose a similar punishment in this similarly harmful
situation. If the harassing phone calls caused
caused the neighbor to suffer from either
either emotional
emotional trauma or a physical
manifestation of that trauma on a level as contemplated
contemplated
manifestation
by second degree assault, then the offender
offender could be
prosecuted
under
a
scheme
of
criminal
IIED. Punishing
prosecuted
lIED.
Punishing
this kind of intentional conduct
conduct to the same degree assecond
second degree assault for intentional conduct that inflicts a similar type of harm, would serve to further the
principles
communiprinciples of our criminal justice
justice system by communicating that this type of conduct is so intolerable
intolerable that it
carries
calTies with it a threat of significant
significant punishment.

can criminal justice system. Two theories largely govem
ern the reasons for assessing punishment:
punishment: retribution and
227
deterrence.
Criminalizing lIED would advance each
deterrence.227
Criminalizing
each
of these theories.
a.

Retribution
Retribution

Professor Nozick's equation
equation for
Application of Professor
evaluating
instances appropriate
appropriate for retribution supevaluating the instances
ports the criminalization
criminalization of lIED. As previously noted,
H, where
H is the
criminal punishment
punishment deserved
deserved = r x H,
where H
magnitude of the wrongness
magnitude
wrongness or harm and r is the degree
ofresponsibility.228
of
responsibility. 221 The high magnitude of harm and the
defendant's
defendant's responsibility in the intentional outrageous
conduct of IIED
well-deserved need for
lIED highlight
highlight the well-deserved
retribution against such conduct.
The rr is this equation is easily satisfied. People
are responsible
IIED only if they intend to commit
responsible for lIED
harm or they know
the outrageous
outrageous conduct
conduct that causes hann
with substantial certainty
certainty that such conduct will cause
229
another
another to suffer from IIED.
IIED.229
This intent translates
translates into
a conscious
conscious or willful desire to bring about a harmful
result. 2300 That they chose to engage in such conduct reflects the high level of responsibility
responsibility on their part.
The law tends to increase the severity
severity of punish231 Homicides
willfulness .21
ment based
based on a defendant's
defendant's willfulness.
Homicides
illustrate this point most clearly. One who intends to
kill by design is guilty of murder, a crime punishable by
life in prison or even death.232
death.2 Thus, an individual who
aims his car at someone standing on the street with an
intention
intention of killing that person is said to be the most responsible
sponsible and therefore the most deserving of punishment. Similarly, one who speeds
speeds through a crowded
crowded
school
o'clock
school zone at three 0'
clock in the afternoon
afternoon is also, in
many jurisdictions,
jurisdictions, responsible for the and deserving
deserving of
of
of anthe charge's maximum punishment
punishment for the death of
23
other.
1 Although this person had no intent of killing a
other.233
particular
certainty that
particular person, he knew with substantial
substantial certainty
.21434
his
result of
as aa result
he would likely kill someone as
of his conduct
conducU
In contrast, one who speeds through a school
school zone at
o'clock
three 0'
clock in the morning is likely to be held only responsible
sponsible for manslaughter
manslaughter or reckless homicide.
homicide.235 In
In
this instance, the individual is said to have only been
been
aware
aware of a slight risk that someone
someone could die as a result
result
ii.
Punish
ii. Why
FVhy Punish
of his conduct. Because
engaged in a risk, soBecause he only engaged
2
ciety
6 In most
ciety is willing to mete out less punishment.
punishment.236
Given
that
IIED
causes
the
same
type
of
harm
Given
lIED
jurisdictions,
manslaughter is punishable
jurisdictions, manslaughter
punishable by five to fiffif27
1
prison.237
as assault, battery, and the other intentional
in prison.
intentional torts, the teen years in
issue becomes whether criminalizing IIED
lIED would furIIED
lIED also imposes
imposes the same
same type of harm as the
ther the principles of punishment that drive the Ameri- other intentional
H in Nozick's
intentional torts, thus the H
Nozick's equation
equation
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is as compelling
compelling for IIED as it is in other tort-based
tort-based
crimes. Particularly,
Particularly, IIED shares the sense of mental
anguish that assault and false imprisonment criminalize.2
noted above,
above, psychological
ize.238 As
As noted
psychological or verbal abuse
can be as damaging as any physical type of
harm. 2239
39 Deofhann.
velopments in neuroscience
neuroscience indicate a strong link beemotional harm. 22"o10 This high
tween verbal assault and emotional
degree of provable physical hann
harm meets the H prong of
of
Therefore, the high magnitude
Nozick's formula. Therefore,
magnitude of
of
harm to the victim and the strong degree of responsibilhann
responsibility on the part of the defendant
criminalization
defendant compel criminalization
of
IIED.
ofIIED.
cyber-stalkers. InNozick's theory is ideal for cyber-stalkers.
dividuals who write directed e-mails or set up false accounts do so with the highest level of intention. The
harm cyber-stalkers
annoyance
hann
cyber-stalkers cause can go far beyond annoyance
and may rise to the level of death. Under Nozick's theory, such conduct
conduct is most suitable for punishment because H, or harm,
hann, is at its greatest.

Crimtort has merit, particularly as it applies to a defendant corporation, where one is unable to single out an
an
individual
individual for punishment. However, a loss of liberty
liberty is
much harsher than a loss of finances. The criminal justice system can, through imposition or threat ofjail
of jail time,
serve
individuals' conduct
serve to curb individuals'
conduct to a much greater degree than pecuniary
pecuniary punishment.

Scientific and technological
technological advances in the way
we currently
currently live our lives mandate that jurisdictions
should grant IIED the same criminal status that it grants
other criminalized
criminalized intentional
intentional torts. Words hurt. The
law punishes those who inflict
inflict pain. The punishment
should be meted out regardless of whether the pain originates through a physical force or through verbal or written words.
Criminalizing
Criminalizing IIED
lIED provides the retributive
b. Deterrence
Deterrence
value of satiating
satiating those who are injured by others'
others'
choice to bully, and it serves the deterrent value of
warnofwamCriminalizing
IIED is equally supported by the ing others
Criminalizing lIED
others that the use of words, whether typed or
or
Deterrence advocates
theory of deterrence. Deterrence
advocates that an in- shouted, is intolerable and prevents words from escalatdividual be punished as an example either to himself or
or ing to a more serious physical harm. There
There is a void in
individual's conduct cannot be tol- our current
criminalization scheme,
to others because
because the individual's
current criminalization
scheme, left empty by the
erated. Ms. Drew intentionally caused
suffer failure to recognize
caused a child to suffer
recognize that technology makes it easier to
by creating a fake internet
"friend" to lure the girl in and harm and that a word can cause as much pain as a punch.
intemet "friend"
society should dis- Criminalizing
then trick her, acting in a way that society
Criminalizing IIED would fill that void.
courage. Her actions caused
caused horrible public outcry, in
conse- Addendum
Addendum
part because of the unnecessary
unnecessary and irreversible
ilTeversible consequences of her actions and in part because
there
were
On January 5 t1,, the BBC reported
because
reported that members
22
2
1
could be
few criminal laws under which she could
Sarkozy's rulihg party probe punished.
punished. "2 of French
French President
President Nicolas Sarkozy's
To the extent
deterrence works to posed a measure
extent that one assumes that deterrence
measure that would criminalize intentional
intentional in245 The proposed measure
encourage
conform to society's
laws, 241 pun- fliction of emotional distress.
distress.245
encourage members to confonn
society's laws,243
ishing this woman at the criminal level could deter oth- would assess criminal
criminal penalties
penalties including jail time
ers from committing similar hamlful
harmful acts.
against those who psychologically
psychologically or verbally abuse
Criminalizing
would their spouse or live-in partner by insult, including reCriminalizing IIED as an inchoate
inchoate crime would
serve
serve the same deterrent value as assault. As noted peated rude
mde remarks about a partner's appearance,
appearance, false
above, the law criminalizes
criminalizes many inchoate crimes as a allegations
allegations of infidelity, and threats of physical viomeans of preventing more serious crimes that could re- lence.11
lence. 21c,' The French parliament is expected to approve
sult from an individual's conduct. The MPC's formula- the legislation
legislation in Febmary.
February. If
passed, the law should be
Ifpassed,
battery is an example of the use of
tion of assault and battery
of in place six months later. IIff passed, the bill would be
be
217
criminalization
permits the pun- the first of its kind.
criminalization as prevention. The law pennits
ishment of those who attempt to cause the physical
physical injury required for proof of battery
criminalizing an
battery by criminalizing
MINNESOTAATTORNEY GENE~"L
GENELRAL LORI
1 See OFFICE OF MIl'i"ESOTAATTO~NtY
LORI SWANSON,
SWANSON, PREVENT
PREVENT
attempted
batterer
(for
example,
assault).2
attempted batterer
assault).2"4 Those who CYBERBULLYING
ONL1NE HARASSMENT,
HARASSMENT,
CYBERBlJLLYING AND ONLINE
subscribe
subscribe to the theory of crimtort, and even many who http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Brochures/pubCyberbullyingOnlineHarasshttp:iiwww.ag. state.mn.us!Brochures/pubCyberbullyingOnlineHarassment.pdf.
do not, might argue that over-criminalization
over-criminalization already ex- ment.pdf.
2 Prezioso v. Thomas, No. 991675, 2000 WL 472874 (4th Cir. Apr. 25,
ists and that there is no need to create
create new crimes. 2 Prezioso v. Thomas, No. 991675, 2000
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v. State, 668 S.E.2d
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v.
S.E.2d 846, 849 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)
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was sufficient to show injury
injury when victim testified that she was thrown
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bruised on multiple parts of her body, experienced
experienced
soreness, and "saw
stars" when defendant struck her in the head with aa
"saw stars"
plank); Arzaga v State, 86 S.W3d
S.W.3d 767, 780 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (holding State proved bodily injury by legally sufficient evidence because victim had at least one abrasion
abrasion on inside of upper lip and her mouth was
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v.
bmised after
aHer being punched by the defendant); Hubert v.
State,
SAV.2d 585, 588 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)
1983) (holding victim's testiState, 652 S.W.2d
mony that
that appellant
appellant struck his
his face
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scratched his
his neck, which
which caused
caused
mony
swelling and tenderness, was sufficient to prove bodily injury); Allen v.
v.
State,
SAV.2d 352, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
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State, 533 S.W.2d
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2005).
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1966)
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159RESTATEMENT
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STRUCTURE OF
(1987))
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(1987)) (stating that the "first cause of action in tort that arose in the
twelfth century as the intentional tort, which allowed damages to be retwelt1h
recovered
covered through the writ of trespass vi et armis in cases of battery").
163 Wilkinson v. Downton,
57 (1897).
(1897). For
163 Wilkinson v.
Downton, 2
2 Q.B.
Q.B. 57
For a
a detailed discussion of
IED and its history; see John J.
Tort Law:
lIED
J. Kircher, The Four
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Liabiliti for
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REV. 789 (2007).
Liability
Emotional Harm,
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(2007).
164Kircher, supra note
note 164,
164, at
at 795
Wilkinson v Downton, 22
164 Kircher, supra
795 (quoting
(quoting Wilkinson
Q.B. 57 (1897)).
(1897)). Before
Before intentional infliction of emotional distress its
its
own separate tort, United States courts allowed recovery for mental distress if it was associated with one's intentional mistreatment
mistreatment of dead
bodies or burial rights. Id.
Id. In 1999,
1999, the Alabama
Alabama Supreme
Supreme Court, rereviewing past history of this old tort, noted that "[i]t
"[i]t has long been the
law ofAlabama
Alabama that mistreatment of burial places and human remains
suffering." Id.
will support the recovery of damages
damages for mental suffering."
Id. (quoting
Gray Brown-Service
Mort1.Jary, Inc. v.
v. Lloyd, 729 So.2d 280 (Ala.
Brown-Service Mortuary,
1999)). Prosser has also noted that recovery for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress had been allowed for "common
"common carriers, telegraph
telegraph
companies, and innkeepers."
Id. (citing W.
NV PAGE KEETON
innkeepers." Id.
KEETON ET AL.,
AL.,
PROSSER AND
AND KEETON
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 43 (West Publishing Co. 5th
5th
ed. 1984) (1941)).
(1941)). The reason why this was the case, it is opined, was
"'the only game in town'"
town' and were the equivathat these entities were "'the
lent of aa "monopoly
"monopoly as to the services they provided to many communities." Id.
ties."
Id. Due to this, people had no choice but to use these services,
closely.
whereby the actions of such services had to be scrutinized quite closely.
Id. Thus, allowing for such a
Id.
a cause of action against common carriers,
telegraph companies, and innkeepers. Id.
Id.
161Id. J'kinson
v. Downton, a late
165 Id. TYilkinson v. Downton, a
late nineteenth
nineteenth century
century case,
case, presents one
of the earliest recognitions of lIED.
IIED. The defendant in Wilkinson
Wlkinson played aa
practical joke on the victim, telling her that her husband's leg had been
been
broken and that, in response, he had been taken for urgent care. Id.
Id. at
at
795. A
Aparticular
particular sense of urgency was included in the defendant's
defendant's tale,
and he urged the plaintiiIto
plaintiff to quickly rush to her husband's side. Consequently, the plaintiff was thrown
thrown into aa violent shock [in] her nervous
system, producing vomiting and other more serious and permanent physical consequences at one time threatening her reason, and entailing
weeks of suffering and incapacity to her as well as expense to her husband for medical attendance. These consequences were not in any way
the result of
of previous ill-health or weakness of constitution, nor was
was
the
there any evidence of predisposition to nervous shock or any other idiosyncrasy. Id.
plaintiff to recover for the harm
Id. The court allowed the plaintiiIto
harm she
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ter of degree. Thus, the draHers
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individual were
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assault, battery,
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false imprisonment
necessalY to prove assault,
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v. Sea
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see
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Breeze, Inc.,
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163, at
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ing a
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committing or
to a person
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interest." Id
Id.
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a special interest."
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at
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2001) (citing Clark v. State, 746 So. 2d 1237 (Fla.
"the degree of injury
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otDepression].
Symptoms of
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some
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effects on physical
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American Psychological Association, Facts
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availableat
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literature on
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the literature
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to
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exhibit increased levels of both anxiety and depression."
! See inf a note 213.
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S.W3d 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
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19, See State v.
v. Cobbins, 21 S.W.3d
sufficient
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!" 2008 XNL
12, 2008).
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19'645 P.2d 916 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).
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v. Hewlett-Packard
Hewlett-Packard Corp.,
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Corp., 228
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
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v. Anborn Eng'g
Eng' g Inc., 468
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P.2d 216,219
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Indeed, racial slurs perpetuated by police officers
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sufficient
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sutlicient evidence of extreme
City of New York, 119 F.
F. Supp. 2d 232,
286 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (reasoning
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v.
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205 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970).
215
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